Trust needs
specifics.

Grip uses one-time email links instead of passwords. Sign-in requests are rate-limited and protected with Cloudflare Turnstile when configured. The response does not reveal whether an email address has an account.

Users may enable TOTP through an authenticator app. When enabled, the second step is enforced before the application returns data and through an additional restrictive database policy. Grip’s platform administration functions require an authorized operator account with the second step completed.

• Private access: new accounts require an invitation or operator grant.
• Sessions are managed by Supabase Auth using secure browser cookies.
• There are no user passwords stored by Grip.

Grip’s domain access functions decide who may read or change Personal, My work and Company data. API and agent operations call those functions rather than reimplementing access checks. PostgreSQL row-level security provides a second enforcement layer.

Personal is limited to its owner unless that owner deliberately shares a folder or allows a connected agent to include Personal. Company is available to current organization members. My work belongs to the organization environment: its member uses it while active, and organization owners can recover it after the membership ends.

• Folder shares are explicit, scoped to read or edit, and revocable.
• Private note titles are not exposed through links a reader cannot follow.
• Suspending a person or organization removes access through the same authorization layer.

Connections to Grip use HTTPS/TLS. The production database, authentication and private file project run on Supabase in Ireland; application functions run on Vercel in Dublin. Those providers apply their own infrastructure encryption and access controls.

Grip also encrypts note titles and bodies, note versions, comment bodies and quoted comment text before they reach the production database. It uses AES-256-GCM with a key held outside the database. The application server can decrypt this content for authorized people, search and agents.

Agents connect only after a user creates a token or approves an OAuth connection. Agent, invitation and OAuth secrets are stored as cryptographic hashes rather than reusable plaintext. OAuth authorization codes are single-use, expire after ten minutes and use PKCE S256; refresh credentials rotate on use.

Connections appear in Settings with their name, scope and last use and can be revoked. Agent actions are recorded against the person and affected object.

Once Grip delivers content to ChatGPT, Claude, Codex, Cursor or another client selected by the user, that provider’s security and privacy terms govern the received copy.

The production application uses a restrictive Content Security Policy, denies framing, limits browser capabilities, blocks unknown hosts outside Vercel routing and rejects state-changing browser requests from other sites. Uploaded files are served from a private bucket with forced safe content types, sandboxing and MIME-sniffing disabled.

When Grip fetches a link saved to Inbox, it rejects local and private-network addresses, checks DNS results at connection time, limits redirects, size and duration, and does not send the user’s browser cookies.

• Turnstile protects sign-in and waitlist forms from automated abuse.
• Application rate limits slow repeated sign-in, invite, import, OAuth and token attempts.
• Cloudflare and infrastructure-provider controls add network-level protection where configured.

The in-application rate limiter is instance-local and is not by itself a distributed denial-of-service control.

The product’s operator admin interface exposes account and organization metadata, limits and audit events—not note content. Infrastructure administration can technically reach systems and the decryption key, so operator access is restricted to what is needed to run and support the private release.

Application, authentication and infrastructure providers produce operational logs, and Grip records agent activity and sensitive platform-admin changes. Grip does not currently operate a 24/7 security operations centre, a formal SIEM programme or a public incident-response SLA.

Supabase and Vercel provide platform backup and resilience capabilities, but Grip has not yet published a tested disaster-recovery plan, recovery-time objective or recovery-point objective. Keep exports of important content; Grip does not promise to be the sole system of record.